6 From:	SMTP%"risks@csl.sri.com" 17-MAY-1993 09:39:04.58 To:	EVERHART CC:	 Subj:	RISKS DIGEST 14.61  % From: RISKS Forum <risks@csl.sri.com> ' Sender: RISKS Forum <risks@csl.sri.com> ! Date: Sat, 15 May 93 10:56:18 PDT  Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.61  Reply-To: risks@csl.sri.com ) To: RISKS-LIST.@csl.sri.com@uu7.psi.com ; ; Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.1.737488578.risks@chiron.csl.sri.com>   J RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest  Saturday 15 May 1993  Volume 14 : Issue 61  F         FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS L    ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator     Contents: 9 Opel Corsa Stops for Mobile Phones (O\ystein Gulbrandsen) / Re: Analog vs Digital Speedometers (Roger Crew) . Re: New NIST/NSA Revelations (Dorothy Denning)( Clipper - A Trojan Horse (Bill Nicholls)D Testimony to Boucher's House Science Subcommittee (Whitfield Diffie)  K  The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest discussing risks; comp.risks is its  K  Usenet counterpart.  Undigestifiers are available throughout the Internet, M  but not from RISKS.  Contributions should be relevant, sound, in good taste, H  objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious.  Diversity isM  welcome.  CONTRIBUTIONS to RISKS@CSL.SRI.COM, with appropriate, substantive  M  "Subject:" line.  Others may be ignored!  Contributions will not be ACKed.   O  The load is too great.  **PLEASE** INCLUDE YOUR NAME & INTERNET FROM: ADDRESS, L  especially .UUCP folks.  REQUESTS please to RISKS-Request@CSL.SRI.COM.       N  Vol i issue j, type "FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM<CR>login anonymous<CR>AnyNonNullPW<CR>O  CD RISKS:<CR>GET RISKS-i.j<CR>" (where i=1 to 14, j always TWO digits).  Vol i L  summaries in j=00; "dir risks-*.*<CR>" gives directory; "bye<CR>" logs out.I  The COLON in "CD RISKS:" is essential.  "CRVAX.SRI.COM" = "128.18.10.1". K  <CR>=CarriageReturn; FTPs may differ; UNIX prompts for username, password.   G  For information regarding delivery of RISKS by FAX, phone 310-455-9300 J  (or send FAX to RISKS at 310-455-2364, or EMail to risks-fax@vortex.com).  L  ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY.I  Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues I  of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise.   F ----------------------------------------------------------------------  # Date: Fri, 14 May 93 09:09:52 +0200 & From: oysteing@taskon.no (Gulbrandsen)+ Subject: Opel Corsa Stops for Mobile Phones   )   >From Motor, the Norwegian AAA monthly:   I   While testing the new Opel Corsa, we brought along a mobile phone.  One M   conversation was enough to kill the motor completely.  The phone was of the L   new nordic 450-system, and the antenna was in the front seat.  At first weM   took it for a coincidence, but it proved to be repeatable: when calling out K   or receiving a call, the car abruptly halted.  The signals from the phone 1   apparently confused the electronics in the car.   J   When we later moved the antennae to the back seat, we only felt a slightL   "tug" from the engine, and with the antennae on the roof, there was no illN   effect.  The importer has passed the message to Opel, Germany, and we expect   it to be fixed ASAP, he says.   J The translation is by me, but I hope the meaning gets through.  [TNX. PGN]    \ystein Gulbrandsen   Taskon A/S   ------------------------------  ! Date: Wed, 12 May 93 00:14:22 PDT ' From: Roger Crew <crew@CS.Stanford.EDU> + Subject: Re: Analog vs Digital Speedometers   7 Digital speedometers have other interesting properties.   D I am reminded of one night when I was out driving on one of the moreC desolate portions of [...pick your favorite interstate...], noticed E another car going absurdly fast and decided to follow it for a bit to F see just how fast (...well okay, I had just recently bought my car andH was about to yield to the temptation to "push the envelope" a bit...).    J The speed turned out to be 85 mph.  Oddly enough, the speed remained quiteH constant.  For the first few minutes, I attributed this to the other carH having a very good cruise control.  I thought it was rather stupid to be@ setting a cruise control that high, but then, who was I to talk?  C A bit more thought and observation revealed that my speed was quite H independent of what I was doing with my accelerator pedal or the generalK terrain I was driving on.  I let up on the gas quite abruptly and this time J could actually feel the car slowing down --- and still I was going 85 mph.  O At this point I noticed the tachometer descending through 4000 rpm and decided  H I had definitely had enough fun for one night.  And then I remembered...  D My car is 1982 model.  In 1982 there was a federal (US) law in forceL forbidding speedometers from showing speeds higher than 85 mph.  This is allM well and good if you have an analog speedometer and can SEE the needle PEGGED  against the upper end.  I It had never occurred to me until that moment that someone would actually & build a digital speedometer that pegs.  M (very) shortly thereafter I had gotten down to a relatively sedate 50mph with N 2000 rpm on the tachometer.  The rest is left as an exercise for the reader...   Roger Crew crew@CS.Stanford.EDU    ------------------------------  ! Date: Wed, 12 May 93 10:20:42 EDT 6 From: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)% Subject: Re: New NIST/NSA Revelations   = David Sobel, CPSR Legal Council, wrote in RISKS DIGEST 14.59:   ; 	The proposed DSS was widely criticized within the computer ? 	industry for its perceived weak security and inferiority to an ? 	existing authentication technology known as the RSA algorithm. : 	Many observers have speculated that the RSA technique was@ 	disfavored by NSA because it was, in fact, more secure than the@ 	NSA-proposed algorithm and because the RSA technique could also' 	be used to encrypt data very securely.   M This is terribly misleading. NIST issued the DSS proposal along with a public K call for comments as part of their normal practice with proposed standards. K The community responded, and NIST promptly addressed the security concerns. K Among other things, the DSS now accommodates longer keys (up to 1024 bits). L As a result of the revisions, the DSS is now considered to be just as strong as RSA.    Dorothy Denning    ------------------------------  & Date: 12 May 1993 13:11:05 -0400 (EDT)# From: Bill Nicholls <billn@bix.com> ! Subject: Clipper - A Trojan Horse   M I've been following the discussion in RISKS about the Clipper chip with great F interest, and have learned a lot about what is planned as well as whatN weaknesses may exist, and why.  But I have gradually become aware of an uneasyE feeling, as though I was missing something important about this chip.   : After some thought about the situation, I have come to theA conclusion that Clipper is in fact a Trojan Horse, in the classic > sense.  This morning I was thinking about why anyone would use> the Clipper chip when existing software security could be much? better than what Clipper offers.  I can see why NSA and FBI are = unhappy about the reality of not being able to crack a really A secure system such as the RSA or DES with a 128 bit key, or a one $ time pad on a floppy disk or CD-ROM.  ? In fact it is quite clear that current techniques are more than > adequate to secure messages beyond even NSA's ability to break? economically.  The simple fact is that fast microprocessors can A generate complexity faster than even huge parallel processors can A break it.  In my opinion, the balance of privacy has gone over to > the individual who uses one of these techniques, and this is a+ sea change - one that cannot be reversed.     @ I think NSA, being expert in this domain, recognized this before< anyone else.  Clipper is clearly an attempt to turn back the> clock to an era when they could crack most any system if there@ was sufficient incentive.  Like all such attempts, this too will% fail.  Why then would it be proposed?   ? It was proposed because hidden inside the Clipper chip proposal = are a number of Trojan Horses, some we are meant to find, and" some we are not.    @ Many people jumped on the key security issue, and I believe that@ was intended to attract our attention and tie up our resources. @ Several good points have been made about that item, which I will> not repeat here.  Another Trojan that we were meant to find is@ the 'weak' crypto issue, the Clipper algorithm being unknown and; not available for public review.  It may well have a hiddena? trapdoor that would not be found easily, yet if it were public,S; it would be found eventually.  If it were found, the publici9 outcry could well cause a big shift in political power.  r  A Beyond those Trojans there are others which I believe we were notl: meant to find.  Consider how the proposal surfaced.  After> lengthy *secret* meetings between NIST and NSA, a Presidential? order appears putting Clipper into play.  What is notable aboutS this?t  < Clipper is the first proposal for encryption that *requires*@ registration of the keys.  Why?  Because, as I said earlier, our: ability to encrypt has vastly outstripped the government's: ability to decrypt.  Registration puts this even, from the? government's point of view.  So where's the Trojan?  The Trojani> is the required registration of keys, mandated by presidential@ order.  Once this precedent is established, the government could> say "Sure, use any method you like, but register the algorithm? and escrow the keys".  This new requirement to register methods : and keys now has the force of law without ever having beenA through the proper process - that is the passing of such a law byg; our elected representatives in the House and Senate, plus a<" public signing by the President.    > I think it is clear that no such law would pass, since it is aA infringement on our liberty (IMHO), for which a vague hand wavingl@ and repeat of the 'National Security' mantra does NOT suffice toA justify.  The first hidden Trojan is the attempted end run aroundn the legislative process.    @ There is a second Trojan in the Clipper proposal that I have notA seen discussed.  It is the establishment of a fixed (but unknown)E: method, with a fixed (but knowable) key as the basis for aA 'secure' communication.  On the surface, this looks acceptable ifo= the key security issues can be resolved.  But it really isn'th; acceptable if you think about how the real world operates. -A Entirely aside from the security of the keys is the nature of how  people handle security.  d  ? Given even the suspicion of a compromised security, most people,A will change their passwords instantly, just to be safe.  But what > do you do when the change requires justification to management> that funds for a new instrument, or more than one, be expended@ for replacement on the basis of a suspicion?  Even if you *know*= that an instrument has been decoded, in many cases management:; will simply accept the government's word that the keys werea2 destroyed rather than replace the instrument(s).    6 What I suspect would really happen is that compromised< instruments would generally remain in place because of human= nature to underestimate the potential threat.  It may well be ; that compromising one instrument can make other instrumentsl< compromised through some trapdoor we don't know about.  So a? single compromised instrument could compromise *unknowingly andT: beyond the key safeguards* any other instrument that had a? conversation with it.  It seems possible that one legal wiretapo/ could cascade into a lot of illegal wiretaps.  a  ; Given the ease with which secure communications can be done : today, both voice and data, for no more than the cost of a@ mid-range PC and some software, I can understand why the FBI and> NSA are concerned.  I can easily sympathize with their problemA because they are carrying heavy responsibilities for the nation.  = But I believe the attempt to turn back the clock is the wrong 	 answer.     : When the Enigma machine was compromised and better methods@ invented, no one suggested that everyone be forced to use EnigmaA machines so the government could still break them if needed.  Buth? this is exactly what the Clipper chip proposal is attempting toe? do, and it has no more chance of succeeding than forcing Enigma A on everyone would.  Worse, it obscures the fact that a sea changem@ has occurred and ignores the need to deal with the new reality. ? The new reality, for some years now, is that methods exist thatn= are secure from everyone from a *technical breaking* point of  view.  n  = The clear conclusion I draw from this is that the FBI and NSAe> must give new attention to other methods of access to the data= they require for security and law enforcement.  This may welle@ mean a return to the days of (heavens) spies, listening devices,? photographic/video recon and other methods.  While the cold wara< was still on, this would probably be unacceptable, but now I@ think we can accept the possible handicap to law enforcement and6 national security rather than yield our own privacy.    > In addition, whatever we do as a nation does not prevent otherA nations from using unbreakable methods, so in any event, both NSAm? and the FBI need to address the 'other methods' issue to remainr effective.     Clipper Chip:  r8 	It isn't needed, we already have better secure methods.+ 	It isn't wanted, except by the government. 9 	It isn't effective, since anyone can use better methods.R= 	It isn't useful because it doesn't address the real problem.,  A Let's toss this Trojan horse, this bad idea, on the scrap heap ofi obscurity.     ------------------------------   Date: Thu, 13 May 1993 at 14h15 " From: whitfield.diffie@eng.sun.comG Subject: Testimony to Boucher's House Science Subcommittee, 11 May 1993t  . 	The Impact of a Secret Cryptographic Standard* 	  on Encryption, Privacy, Law Enforcement 			and Technology    			Whitfield Diffieh 			Sun Microsystems  			  11 May 1993  I     I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Congressman Boucher, theaI other members of the committee, and the committee staff for giving us thewA opportunity to appear before the committee and express our views.y  F     On Friday, the 16th of April, a sweeping new proposal for both theN promotion and control of cryptography was made public on the front page of theC New York Times and in press releases from the White House and other  organizations.  F     This proposal was to adopt a new cryptographic system as a federalL standard, but at the same time to keep the system's functioning secret.  TheK standard would call for the use of a tamper resistant chip, called Clipper,aN and embody a `back door' that will allow the government to decrypt the traffic3 for law enforcement and national security purposes.y  N     So far, available information about the chip is minimal and to some extentF contradictory, but the essence appears to be this: When a Clipper chipM prepares to encrypt a message, it generates a short preliminary signal ratheriI candidly entitled the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field.  Before anothereL Clipper chip will decrypt the message, this signal must be fed into it.  TheL Law Enforcement Exploitation Field or LEEF is tied to the key in use and theG two must match for decryption to be successful.  The LEEF in turn, whenoN decrypted by a government held key that is unique to the chip, will reveal the  key used to encrypt the message.  N     The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the back of theL combination locks used on the lockers of school children.  The children openM the locks with the combinations, which is supposed to keep the other childrenvF out, but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the key.  M     In the month that has elapsed since the announcement, we have studied the L Clipper chip proposal as carefully as the available information permits.  WeK conclude that such a proposal is at best premature and at worst will have aeM damaging effect on both business security and civil rights without making anyt improvement in law enforcement.w  J     To give you some idea of the importance of the issues this raises, I'dI like to suggest that you think about what are the most essential securitypL mechanisms in your daily life and work.  I believe you will realize that theN most important things any of you ever do by way of security have nothing to doG with guards, fences, badges, or safes.  Far and away the most importanteM element of your security is that you recognize your family, your friends, andkJ your colleagues.  Probably second to that is that you sign your signature,N which provides the people to whom you give letters, checks, or documents, withK a way of proving to third parties that you have said or promised something.fN Finally you engage in private conversations, saying things to your loved ones,J your friends, or your staff that you do not wish to be overheard by anyone else.   M     These three mechanisms lean heavily on the physical: face to face contactpF between people or the exchange of written messages.  At this moment inK history, however, we are transferring our medium of social interaction fromuK the physical to the electronic at a pace limited only by the development ofeJ our technology.  Many of us spend half the day on the telephone talking toK people we may visit in person at most a few times a year and the other halfe? exchanging electronic mail with people we never meet in person.r  L     Communication security has traditionally been seen as an arcane securityM technology of real concern only to the military and perhaps the banks and oilgN companies.  Viewed in light of the observations above, however, it is revealedN as nothing less than the transplantation of fundamental social mechanisms fromM the world of face to face meetings and pen and ink communication into a world M of electronic mail, video conferences, electronic funds transfers, electronictG data interchange, and, in the not too distant future, digital money and  electronic voting.  K     No right of private conversation was enumerated in the constitution.  IeK don't suppose it occurred to anyone at the time that it could be prevented. N Now, however, we are on the verge of a world in which electronic communicationF is both so good and so inexpensive that intimate business and personalH relationships will flourish between parties who can at most occasionallyL afford the luxury of traveling to visit each other.  If we do not accept theN right of these people to protect the privacy of their communication, we take aN long step in the direction of a world in which privacy will belong only to the rich.s  J     The import of this is clear: The decisions we make about communicationF security today will determine the kind of society we live in tomorrow.    @     The objective of the administration's proposal can be simply stated:,  7 	They want to provide a high level of security to their 7 	friends, while being sure that the equipment cannot bei3 	used to prevent them from spying on their enemies.r  I Within a command society like the military, a mechanism of this sort thattG allows soldiers' communications to be protected from the enemy, but noteN necessarily from the Inspector General, is an entirely natural objective.  Its? imposition on a free society, however, is quite another matter.u  M     Let us begin by examining the monitoring requirement and ask both whether M it is essential to future law enforcement and what measures would be required  to make it work as planned.y  K     Eavesdropping, as its name reminds us, is not a new phenomenon.  But in N spite of the fact that police and spies have been doing it for a long time, itH has acquired a whole new dimension since the invention of the telegraph.G Prior to electronic communication, it was a hit or miss affair.  Postal L services as we know them today are a fairly new phenomenon and messages wereF carried by a variety of couriers, travelers, and merchants.  SensitiveN messages in particular, did not necessarily go by standardized channels.  PaulM Revere, who is generally remembered for only one short ride, was the AmericanoN Revolution's courier, traveling routinely from Boston to Philadelphia with his) saddle bags full of political broadsides.h    F     Even when a letter was intercepted, opened, and read, there was noK guarantee, despite some people's great skill with flaps and seals, that thes& victim would not notice the intrusion.  I     The development of the telephone, telegraph, and radio have given the J spies a systematic way of intercepting messages.  The telephone provides aK means of communication so effective and convenient that even people who arenJ aware of the danger routinely put aside their caution and use it to conveyL sensitive information.  Digital switching has helped eavesdroppers immenselyH in automating their activities and made it possible for them to do theirI listening a long way from the target with negligible chance of detection.   M     Police work was not born with the invention of wiretapping and at present M the significance of wiretaps as an investigative tool is quite limited.  EvenlD if their phone calls were perfectly secure, criminals would still beF vulnerable to bugs in their offices, body wires on agents, betrayal byM co-conspirators who saw a brighter future in cooperating with the police, and  ordinary forensic inquiry.  M     Moreover, cryptography, even without intentional back doors, will no more E guarantee that a criminal's communications are secure than the EnigmaeB guaranteed that German communications were secure in World War II.N Traditionally, the richest source of success in communications intelligence is? the ubiquity of busts: failures to use the equipment correctly.   N     Even if the best cryptographic equipment we know how to build is availableK to them, criminal communications will only be secure to the degree that thepJ criminals energetically pursue that goal.  The question thus becomes, ``IfG criminals energetically pursue secure communications, will a government 4 standard with a built in inspection port, stop them.  K     It goes without saying that unless unapproved cryptography is outlawed,oN and probably even if it is, users bent on not having their communications readK by the state will implement their own encryption.  If this requires them toeI forgo a broad variety of approved products, it will be an expensive routefE taken only by the dedicated, but this sacrifice does not appear to bee
 necessary.  F     The law enforcement function of the Clipper system, as it has beenJ described, is not difficult to bypass.  Users who have faith in the secretL Skipjack algorithm and merely want to protect themselves from compromise viaN the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field, need only encrypt that one item at theN start of transmission.  In many systems, this would require very small changesM to supporting programs already present.  This makes it likely that if Clipper,J chips become as freely available as has been suggested, many products will> employ them in ways that defeat a major objective of the plan.  L     What then is the alternative?  In order to guarantee that the governmentK can always read Clipper traffic when it feels the need, the construction ofnH equipment will have to be carefully controlled to prevent non-conformingG implementations.  A major incentive that has been cited for industry toeL implement products using the new standard is that these will be required forK communication with the government.  If this strategy is successful, it is atJ club that few manufacturers will be able to resist.  The program thereforeI threatens to bring communications manufacturers under an all encompassingi regulatory regime.  D     It is noteworthy that such a regime already exists to govern theI manufacture of equipment designed to protect `unclassified but sensitive'nL government information, the application for which Clipper is to be mandated.F The program, called the Type II Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program,L requires facility clearances, memoranda of agreement with NSA, and access toM secret `Functional Security Requirements Specifications.'  Under this programoN member companies submit designs to NSA and refine them in an iterative process) before they are approved for manufacture.t  K     The rationale for this onerous procedure has always been, and with muchlJ justification, that even though these manufacturers build equipment aroundN approved tamper resistant modules analogous to the Clipper chip, the equipmentK must be carefully vetted to assure that it provides adequate security.  One N requirement that would likely be imposed on conforming Clipper applications isC that they offer no alternative or additional encryption mechanisms.h  M     Beyond the damaging effects that such regulation would have on innovation M in the communications and computer industries, we must also consider the factsH that the public cryptographic community has been the principal source ofE innovation in cryptography.  Despite NSA's undocumented claim to havelM discovered public key cryptography, evidence suggests that, although they maytJ have been aware of the mathematics, they entirely failed to understand theK significance.  The fact that public key is now widely used in government aslI well as commercial cryptographic equipment is a consequence of the publict& community being there to show the way.  M     Farsightedness continues to characterize public research in cryptography,iL with steady progress toward acceptable schemes for digital money, electronicL voting, distributed contract negotiation, and other elements of the computer& mediated infrastructure of the future.  L     Even in the absence of a draconian regulatory framework, the effect of aN secret standard, available only in a tamper resistant chip, will be a profoundH increase in the prices of many computing devices.  Cryptography is oftenL embodied in microcode, mingled on chips with other functions, or implementedM in dedicated, but standard, microprocessors at a tiny fraction of the tens ofu3 dollars per chip that Clipper is predicted to cost.r  J     What will be the effect of giving one or a small number of companies aM monopoly on tamper resistant parts?  Will there come a time, as occurred withvL DES, when NSA wants the standard changed even though industry still finds itF adequate for many applications?  If that occurs will industry have anyI recourse but to do what it is told?  And who will pay for the conversion?e  H     One of the little noticed aspects of this proposal is the arrival ofN tamper resistant chips in the commercial arena.  Is this tamper resistant partC merely the precursor to many?  Will the open competition to improveeM semiconductor computing that has characterized the past twenty-years give wayiN to an era of trade secrecy?  Is it perhaps tamper resistance technology rather+ than cryptography that should be regulated?     J     Recent years have seen a succession of technological developments thatJ diminish the privacy available to the individual.  Cameras watch us in theJ stores, x-ray machines search us at the airport, magnetometers look to seeM that we are not stealing from the merchants, and databases record our actionsiH and transactions.  Among the gems of this invasion is the British RafterL technology that enables observers to determine what station a radio or TV isM receiving.  Except for the continuing but ineffectual controversy surroundingiM databases, these technologies flourish without so much as talk of regulation.m    H     Cryptography is perhaps alone in its promise to give us more privacyJ rather than less, but here we are told that we should forgo this technicalN benefit and accept a solution in which the government will retain the power toK intercept our ever more valuable and intimate communications and will allow ( that power to be limited only by policy.    N     In discussion of the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal --- which would haveJ required communication providers, at great expense to themselves, to buildH eavesdropping into their switches --- it was continually emphasized thatM wiretaps were an exceptional investigative measure only authorized when otherdL measures had failed.  Absent was any sense that were the country to make theI proposed quarter billion dollar inventment in intercept equipment, courts M could hardly fail to accept the police argument that a wiretap would save thedK people thousands of dollars over other options.  As Don Cotter, at one timedE director of Sandia National Laboratories, said in respect to militarye$ strategy: ``Hardware makes policy.''  M     Law, technology, and economics are three central elements of society thatcM must all be kept in harmony if freedom is to be secure.  An essential elementeK of that freedom is the right to privacy, a right that cannot be expected tooI stand against unremitting technological attack.  Where technology has thenN capacity to support individual rights, we must enlist that support rather thanN rejecting it on the grounds that rights can be abused by criminals.  If we putN the desires of the police ahead of the rights of the citizens often enough, weM will shortly find that we are living in police state.  We must instead assuresI that the rights recognized by law are supported rather than undermined byi technology.d    J     At NSA they believe in something they call `security in depth.'  TheirK most valuable secret may lie encrypted on a tamper resistant chip, inside arI safe, within a locked office, in a guarded building, surrounded by barbedhK wire, on a military base.  I submit to you that the most valuable secret ineJ the world is the secret of democracy; that technology and policy should goN hand in hand in guarding that secret; that it must be protected by security in depth.     			Recommendations  N     There is a crying need for improved security in American communication andL computing equipment and the Administration is largely correct when it blamesN the problem on a lack of standards.  One essential standard that is missing isL a more secure conventional algorithm to replace DES, an area of cryptography4 in which NSA's expertise is probably second to none.  4     I urge the committee to take what is good in the9 Administration's proposal and reject what is bad. \begdise  F       o The Skipjack algorithm and every other aspect of this proposal9 	should be made public, not only to expose them to publica6 	scrutiny but to guarantee that once made available as2 	standards they will not be prematurely withdrawn.9 	Configuration control techniques pioneered by the publicc> 	community can be used to verify that some pieces of equipment= 	conform to government standards stricter than the commercialt 	where that is appropriate.l  A       o I likewise urge the committee to recognize that the right : 	to private conversation must not be sacrificed as we move= 	into a telecommunicated world and reject the Law Enforcementy> 	Exploitation Function and the draconian regulation that would 	necessarily come with it.  @       o I further urge the committee to press the Administration6 	to accept the need for a sound international security9 	technology appropriate to the increasingly international " 	character of the world's economy.   ------------------------------   End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.61r ************************