6 From:	SMTP%"risks@csl.sri.com"  2-JUN-1993 09:20:52.39 To:	EVERHART CC:	 Subj:	RISKS DIGEST 14.68  % From: RISKS Forum <risks@csl.sri.com> ' Sender: RISKS Forum <risks@csl.sri.com>   Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 17:44:38 PDT Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.68  Reply-To: risks@csl.sri.com ) To: RISKS-LIST.@csl.sri.com@uu7.psi.com ; ; Message-Id: <CMM.0.90.1.738981878.risks@chiron.csl.sri.com>   I RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest  Tuesday 1 June 1993  Volume 14 : Issue 68   F         FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS L    ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator     Contents: - Error on California Unemployment Checks (PGN) / Re: Fake ATM Machine Steals PINs (Dan Franklin) + Re: CHI & the Color-blind? (John R. Levine) J Defending Crypto with the 2nd Amendment (Peter K. Boucher, David A. Honig,     Jim Purtilo)> Get yer RSA encryption now! (more on CLIPPER) (Jay Schmidgall) Re: Clipper (Carl Ellison)B AIS BBS (Kim Clancy, Paul Ferguson, Vesselin Bontchev, Jim Thomas)  K  The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest discussing risks; comp.risks is its  K  Usenet counterpart.  Undigestifiers are available throughout the Internet, M  but not from RISKS.  Contributions should be relevant, sound, in good taste, H  objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious.  Diversity isM  welcome.  CONTRIBUTIONS to RISKS@CSL.SRI.COM, with appropriate, substantive  M  "Subject:" line.  Others may be ignored!  Contributions will not be ACKed.   O  The load is too great.  **PLEASE** INCLUDE YOUR NAME & INTERNET FROM: ADDRESS, L  especially .UUCP folks.  REQUESTS please to RISKS-Request@CSL.SRI.COM.       N  Vol i issue j, type "FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM<CR>login anonymous<CR>AnyNonNullPW<CR>O  CD RISKS:<CR>GET RISKS-i.j<CR>" (where i=1 to 14, j always TWO digits).  Vol i L  summaries in j=00; "dir risks-*.*<CR>" gives directory; "bye<CR>" logs out.I  The COLON in "CD RISKS:" is essential.  "CRVAX.SRI.COM" = "128.18.10.1". K  <CR>=CarriageReturn; FTPs may differ; UNIX prompts for username, password.   G  For information regarding delivery of RISKS by FAX, phone 310-455-9300 J  (or send FAX to RISKS at 310-455-2364, or EMail to risks-fax@vortex.com).  L  ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY.I  Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues I  of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise.   F ----------------------------------------------------------------------    Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 17:26:46 PDT. From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>0 Subject: Error on California Unemployment Checks  J The California Employment Development Department sent out 75,000 duplicateN unemployment checks --- which it attributed to a "computer error" [you guessedI it, right?].  "Those who cash their checks will be asked to reimburse the B state or will have future benefits docked," said a spokesperson.  H [Source: San Francisco Chronicle, article by Jonathan Marshall, p. A15.]  I   [I wonder what the increased workload will be in trying to recover from M   this accident, and whether they will actually catch all of those who cashed L   the extra check or will do so at some point in the next six months!  PGN]    ------------------------------    Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:59:45 EDT* From: "Dan Franklin" <dan@diamond.bbn.com>) Subject: Re: Fake ATM Machine Steals PINs   O Brinton Cooper <abc@brl.mil> suggests several good ways to reduce the RISK that ' you're dealing with a fake ATM machine.   I Another way to "authenticate" an ATM machine is to use it to ask for your J bank balance--a piece of information only a genuine ATM would (presumably)M have.  Since you can't do this without giving the machine your PIN, a failure M means you have to check your bank balance every few days thereafter to see if K someone made a withdrawal--or just change your PIN.  But if you believe the M risk of the machine being fake is low, and a way to phone the bank whose name D appears on the machine is not apparent, this is another possibility.  
 	Dan Franklin    ------------------------------  " Date: 20 May 93 21:12:50 EDT (Thu)1 From: johnl@iecc.cambridge.ma.us (John R. Levine) # Subject: Re: CHI & the Color-blind?   K The question of whether color-blind people can see signs and controls isn't K particularly a computer related one, but is certainly made more of an issue 9 by the complex interfaces common in computerized systems.   N The number of people affected is surprisingly large.  I'm not very color blindN and have no trouble telling red from green, so long as they are fairly bright,E but a have a real problem with black-on-red or red-on black signs and F displays.  They look like, say, maroon on crimson, with practically noI contrast.  (For some reason, green doesn't seem to have this problem.)  I M believe this is a common problem for the large number of slightly color blind I people.  For the more severely color blind there is also the better-known N problem is of not being able to distinguish between reds and greens of similar brightness.   I For designers of computer displays, I'd think it would be straightforward G to test them for color-blind robustness by replacing the color pallette D used in the program with a monochrome one that maps each color to anI suitably bright shade of grey.  Or if that's hard, one could always point = a video camera at the sign or display and show the image on a  black-and-white TV.    Regards,E John Levine, johnl@iecc.cambridge.ma.us, {spdcc|ima|world}!iecc!johnl    ------------------------------  " Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:13:52 -0700. From: "Peter K. Boucher" <boucher@csl.sri.com>0 Subject: Defending Crypto with the 2nd Amendment  @ There's a risk in associating your cause with the 2nd Amendment.= Some constitutional protections are "more equal" than others.   . hunter@ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (Larry Hunter) writes:  J > ...  One consequence of that balance is that you cannot legally possess D > nuclear weapons or even, say, a .50 caliber machine gun privately.  K "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, G the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."   I Everyone I know who has studied the history of this statement agrees that H it means that "the people" must have unrestricted access to all types ofH arms, in order to a) obviate the need for a standing army, and b) defendI the country in the absence of a standing army.  No one I know expects (or D desires) that private ownership of nuclear arms be allowed (althoughB private ownership of the most powerful weapons of the day, such asG canons, was common in the 18th century, and is exactly what the framers H of the constitution sought to protect).  Also, a .50 caliber machine gunC can be purchased legally in most states, if you pay the appropriate  federal tax.  + Paul Robinson <TDARCOS@MCIMAIL.COM> writes:   = > Judges frown heavily on laws mandating prior restraint, ...   J This is good if use you some other amendment (not the 2nd) to back up yourL case.  The Brady Bill (which mandates a 5-day waiting period on the purchaseF of a handgun) is pure prior restraint.  There is no empirical evidenceJ whatsoever that it will have any beneficial impact on the level of violentN crime in the U.S.  Such laws have been enacted in several states, but none hasM ever been shown to have reduced any aspect of violent crime.  Even though the I premise of such laws is "government must restrain the people prior to the L purchase of a handgun, on the chance that the purchaser might be planning toH commit a crime with it," none of them has ever been struck down for this reason.   M Pick another amendment with which to defend crypto, because the 2nd is risky.    Peter K. Boucher   ------------------------------   Date: 31 May 93 20:34:21 GMT0 From: "David A. Honig" <honig@binky.ICS.UCI.EDU>? Subject: Re: Crypto and the 2nd Amendment (Hunter, RISKS-14.65)    PGN writes:   H >   [Incidentally, at last week's IEEE Symposium on Research in SecurityE >   and Privacy, a rump group decided that because crypto falls under L >   munitions controls, the right to bear arms must sanction private uses of >   cryptography!  PGN]K  J While this may amuse some, this actually addresses at a profound and oftenK overlooked intent of the 'Founding Fathers'.  The People are guarenteed the N right to bear arms, not just for personal defense (which was obvious to them),K but also because: politicians prefer unarmed peasants.  An unarmed populace E is much easier to dominate.  And so is a populace without the ability  to have privacy.   David Honig    ------------------------------  " Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:25:51 -0400& From: purtilo@cs.UMD.EDU (Jim Purtilo); Subject: Re: Crypto as "Right to Bear Arms" issue, followup   I Just a point of information concerning Larry Hunter's post on the analogy(K between encryption as a "fundamental right" and other rights, such as thoseD5 recognized by the US Bill of Rights.  Larry observes:nK # ... I am completely convinced that framers of the Constitution would have E # wholeheartedly endorsed citizen access to effective encryption as aS # fundamental right.  ...t  I Unfortunately, Larry then reasons that "the `right to keep and bear arms'aK strategy for defending encryption doesn't seem like to succeed practically"hF based upon some erroneous assumptions concerning the second amendment.  K #  ....  there are several practical problems with the idea.  First of all,SK # constitutional rights must be balanced against each other.  Your right toiL # bear arms is balanced against the rights of your neighbors to pursue theirK # happiness in an orderly society.  One consequence of that balance is thatEM # you cannot legally possess ... , say, a .50 caliber machine gun privately. R  L Of course, some thoughtful citizens would observe that there is no balancingL act in Larry's statement.  Your neighbors' ability pursue their happiness inG an orderly society is enhanced by both your and their ability to acceptIL responsibility for personal safety in this otherwise unsafe world.  And thisL includes responsibility for protection from potentially corrupt governments.  L Regardless, by the analogy to personal weaponry (machine gun), Larry weakensL his point unnecessarily, since in fact these *can* be owned and used in thisL country.  They are taxed and regulated, but nevertheless legal to own by anyL honest citizen, not otherwise having local restrictions.  The real balancingJ act in his analogy is between too-powerful government and the threat posedL by an armed citizenry -- and in fact our history has many examples where theK government has backed off or altered potentially unfair policies based uponnL the fear of the consequences when We the People reasserted control via arms.  I Information is the ultimate in personal "arms".  In today's age, how elsepL than by knowing the citizenry's thoughts and plans can a government preserveL and protect its power base?  That is to say, encryption technology becomes aK powerful protection of citizens from from too-big government, and *control* / of encryption is that big-government's counter.a  G Fortunately, Larry concludes with a message many of us soundly support:lK #                                                              We should besL # fighting the claim that cryptography is useful primarily to criminals (andI # is therefore threatening) for precisely the same reason [that we fight >? # claims that speech, arms, etc. are only useful to criminals.]b   Jim Purtiloe   ------------------------------  + Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 08:16:07 -0500 (CDT)c0 From: Jay Schmidgall <shmdgljd+@rchland.ibm.com>6 Subject: Get yer RSA encryption now! (more on CLIPPER)  , In RISKS DIGEST 14.64, drand@osf.org writes:O |> That the crooks could always create more effective crypto gear is also a redlL |> herring.  Maybe they could.  But the law is being structured so that thisN |> itself would be considered probable cause of a crime.  We'll have to see ifM |> (how much) this is abused.  One hopes that just the unlicensed crypto gearn3 |> would not be sufficient to indict honest people.   K Ok, I guess I must have skimmed over this part.  Let me see if I understande this properly:  0 	If I have got more secure crypto gear, probable, 	cause exists that I have committed a crime.  L Hmmm.  Does this include any crypto gear that may have been purchased beforeL the corresponding CLIPPER-enabled gear became available?  Or am I allowed toN deduct the cost of the gear I previously bought as well as the cost of the new7 CLIPPER gear I must buy to fall into line with the law?c  H Of course, this becomes a powerful tool for anyone interested in securedM international information exchange.  Since it is probable that most countriesnI that use an existing (more secure?) encryption standard are not likely to L switch to CLIPPER, any one exchanging such information must own gear capableL of understanding that encryption.  Hence, probable cause and you are tapped.  N Hmmm again.  Does knowledge of the encryption algorithm also count as probablyK cause?  After all, one can always do it in software... Hmmm again.  Do they J have to be able to find a program which implements it, or merely some text which describes the algorithm?  M I expect this will become worse than the witch hunts of old; however, insteadhK of starting a rumour that someone you don't like is a warlock or witch, the $ rumour will be that "Jay knows RSA!"  J Somehow, to me this seems the most horrific part of this whole mess.  I do hope I've misunderstood.  = jay@vnet.ibm.com    (c) Copyright 1993.  All rights reserved.o   ------------------------------  ( Date:           Wed, 19 May 93 21:48 EDT" From: Carl_Ellison@vos.stratus.com* Subject: Re: Clipper (Bidzos, RISKS-14.64)   Jim Bidzos writes:  O >The only way to make that advantage "disappear" is to publish everything about N >Capstone, including the algorithm that the keys you manage are used with, andM >wait a few years and a few hundred papers before proposing it as a standard.l  A Whit Diffie also asked for publication of the Skipjack algorithm.   K That's good, as far as it goes, but it's possibly more important to publishrK papers giving design rules and cryptanalysis methods so that the readershipnH can judge the quality of your cipher design methods.  This occurs in theI private sector (especially in academia) but is not something we're likely  to see from the NSA.  H Although I would love to learn their methods, I wouldn't want the NSA toH publish these details.  I want my tax dollars to be of some good and NSA  secrecy is part of that package.  G So -- I just don't want any NSA involvement in commercial cryptography.hG We'll limp along on our own.  Perhaps, if we do something really stupidaI (eg., use RSA when the NSA knows that the PRC's cryptanalysts know how torJ factor 1000 bit numbers in seconds) they'll be nice enough to tell us, butF that's the limit of the interaction I would hope to have with the NSA.  H In particular, I hope this round of examination of export policy exemptsI commercial cryptography (especially freely available code) from controls.eC It's not even good gallows humor that my company is restricted fromfG shipping DES subroutine code to a country where there is DES subroutinet code already on BBSs.e  G Then again, maybe that is how we will have to develop code from now on:sJ write code assuming that the customer will find and install his own public2 domain subroutine packages of DES, RSA, etc.  ....   ------------------------------  ! Date: Mon, 17 May 93 10:02:00 EDTt, From: Kim Clancy <clancy@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov>C Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) " Subject: Re: AIS BBS (RISKS-14.61)  K I am the sysop for the AIS BBS mentioned earlier.  I would like to submit 2 M pieces of information for your readers.  One, the bbs number is 304-420-6083,eK although that will be changing soon, details are on the bbs.  The second isuJ that the screen captures displayed in the message to RISKS were done at atF time when Mary Clark was taking care of the administrative function ofF upgrading user's access.  She is a trainee and has no decisions on theL management of the bbs; that is my job.  I don't want to see her name tied toN this as she is only functioning as directed.  Her name was only on the bbs forJ a short period of time and has since been removed.  It is unfortunate thatN this screen capture occurred during the very short period of time her name wasJ listed, at least I view it as that.  Any questions about the bbs should be) directed to me.  Thanks much.  Kim Clancy    ------------------------------  ! Date: Mon, 17 May 93 09:55:57 EDT % From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)-E Subject: Re: Questioning AIS purpose and defending anonymous posting @           (Friedman, RISKS-14.60)  :F  This reference was extracted from Computer Underground Digest, (CuD),B  #5.36 (May 16 1993), File 2--Building Bridges of Understanding in  LE & Comp. Community -r  tE > The problem with many of these formats is that they tend to exclude.D > the average computer user or law enforcement agent. There's now anA > alternative. Kim Clancy, a security specialist for the Dept. ofsD > Treasury's Office of Public Debt, has begun the "round-table forumH > on Mindvox to bring a variety of views into open dialogue.  The intentH > is to increase the understanding by the public of the legitimate tasksG > of law enforcement, and to expand an awareness of the civil liberties D > concerns of the computer public for investigators and others.  LawE > enforcement personnel are understandably hesitant to engage in suchrA > discussions. But, from what I've seen, there is no ranting, thehC > discussions are generally of high quality (although an occasionaleG > topic drift does occur), and those participating are sincere in their5# > attempts to stimulate discussion.   c [...]s   D > Kim's [Clancy] credentials for moderating this type of a forum areD > impressive. In addition to her security and anti-virus skills, sheD > set up the AIS BBS, BBS run by Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of PublicC > Debt.  Run by Computer Security Branch,  AIS BBS is intended as a.@ > resource for security specialists, scholars, or others seekingE > information about the varieties of computer abuse and how to combatrC > them. The files range from CERT advisories, documents on viruses,tF > and "underground" files to simple public domain/shareware utilities,B > such as virus checkers. For those lacking ftp access, AIS BBS isB > an excellent source of information and a public service of valueB > to a broad range of computer professionals and researchers.  The= > AIS number is currently (304) 420-6083, in late may it willw > change to (304) 480-6083.e  f [ remainder deleted ]y  fK Since the proverbial cat is out of the bag, I think the original poster wassM justified to post the alert anonymously. I'd heard about this "service" being N run by Clancy a while back, but had actually verified that virus disassembliesG were available on AIS. Since that time (and quite possibly since publictM disclosure or because of a change of direction), the SysOp of that system whoeN was once listed as "Mary Clark" has since been replaced by Clancy as the pointJ of contact on the system. Also, it would appear that they have removed the% virus disassembly from public access.    K I don't think that its proper to question a posters integrity simply on thepE basis that the message was posted anonymously. I think that there arehE instances where anonymity on the network can be a good (and sometimeslM necessary) thing. The situation of anonymous posting is solely dependent uponaI the language, content and context of the information contained within the@N message and in these interesting days of Big Brother, it might even be in someN folks best interest to post anonymously any information that may be considered' derogatory with regards to Uncle Sugar.l   Power to the "little" people.   L Paul Ferguson, Network Integrator, Centreville, Virginia USA fergp@sytex.com   ------------------------------  # Date: Wed, 12 May 93 22:45:02 +0200d< From: bontchev@informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)A Subject: Risks of anonymity and credulity (Friedman, RISKS-14.60)v  F I don't know who the anonymous submitter was, but I do know who is theC second person who wished to remain anonymous, for the simple reasonIB that he has sent me the full file non-anonymously. In fact, I knowC this person personally and he is a very respectful person. BTW, theeE part that has been published here is less than 1% of the full file. Ia7 can send it to you, if you still don't believe.   [...]P  4 > I fully believe that our government sometimes doesJ > things that are stupid, immoral, and illegal, but this isn't the kind of > stupidity that they do.h  F Well, maybe you shouldn't be that much confident about the things that> your government can do... Anyway, I do not know whether the USF Government really supports the BBS in question. All I know is that the BBS claims to be "official".  K > In short, we need to be critical thinkers.  In addition, we need to thinkeK > about the way in which anonymous posting lets things like this get widely H > disseminated without exposing the original poster to embarrassment andO > ridicule.  The next hoax, lie, or distortion from an anonymous source may not K > be this obvious.  Is the ability to anonymously make this kind of claim a  > risk?n  L Actually, the anonymous poster did a service to all of us by bringing such aJ topic for discussion. What are the RISKS of ignoring valuable information,M just because the person who has posted it wished to remain anonymous? Another L issue is what are the RISKS of misusing the freedom of speech and officially spreading viruses around...2  K I am Bulgarian and my country is known as the home of many productive virusKE writers, but at least our government has never officially distributed"
 viruses...N                                       bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.deN Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of HamburgN Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C, D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany +49-40-54715-224   ------------------------------  ! Date:    Thu, 13 May 93 02:19 CDTlK From: Jim Thomas (tk0jut1@niu.bitnet)                  <TK0JUT1@NIU.BITNET>t Subject: Re: RISKS DIGEST 14.60   I In Risks (Vol 14 #58) appeared a post that makes us appreciate freedom of J speech and information exchange we enjoy in the U.S. The primary risk I'veM learned after reading the post is that anonymous posters with an axe to grindh/ are potential threats to freedom of expression.o  E Two anonymous posters falsely depict AIS BBS, a bulletin board run by-< Dept of Treasury/Office of Public Debt personnel as a publicC information service, as a board engaged in "unethical, immoral, andl" possibly illegal activities" [...]  ? The remainder of the anonymous post presents screen captures of = directories and files to which the poster objects. Especiallyt@ troublesome for the anonymous accusers are virus-oriented files.  N AIS is a reputable and professionally run open-access BBS.  It has one of mostG extensive collections of text and other files related to all aspects oftJ security in the country. Some may object to some of the materials, just asM some might object to RISKS DIGEST or CuD being "funded" with taxpayers money.oK It strikes me as reprehensible to take selected material out of context andoI piece together an image of immorality or worse by presenting a misleading L image of the materials on the BBS and the purposes for which those materialsJ are intended.  That the accusers make their claims while hiding behind theL cloak of anonymity strikes me as the type of cowardice associated with witch hunts.  J The anonymous posters seem to be bothered by the existence of virus sourceK code on the board. I wager one would learn far more about virus writing andrF distribution tactics from VIRUS-L than from the AIS files, but the twoG anonymous posters seem to be part of a handful of strident pseudo-moraltN entrepreneurs who feel that only the information they judge as appropriate forN public consumption should be made available.  I'm surprised that the anonymousK critics did not also include a demand that public libraries also be closed..  F It is one thing to disagree with the position of another and raise theN contentious issues as a matter of public debate. It is quite another to engageN in the cowardly act of anonymously distorting the function of a legitimate andH widely-used BBS by insinuating "unethical, immoral, and possibly illegal activities."  E CuD ran an interview with the AIS BBS personnel (CuD 4.37, 1992), and > a few excerpts may put the purposes of AIS BBS in perspective:  .                         *** begin excerpts ***  F      Q: What is this Board? (name, number, who runs it (dept & sysop).@      What kind of software are you using?  When did the Board go
      on-line?e  C      A: The Bulletin Board System (BBS) is run by the Bureau of theoE      Public Debt's, Office of Automated Information System's SecuritynC      Branch.  The mission of the Bureau is to administer Treasury'stE      debt finance operations and account for the resulting debt.  TheaC      OAIS security branch is responsible for managing Public Debt'sPF      computer systems security.  The AIS BBS is open to the public andA      the phone number for the Board is (304) 420-6083.  There areeB      three sysops, who manage the Remote Access software.  The BBSF      operates on a stand-alone pc and is not connected to any of other?      Public Debt systems.  The Board is not used to disseminatecE      sensitive information, and has been up operating for the past 15s7      months. <<This interview was as of mid-1992 - jt>>h  5      Q: What are the goals and purposes of the Board?n  E      A: The BBS was established to help manage Public Debt's securityeE      program.  Security managers are located throughout Public Debt'si@      offices in Parkersburg, WV and Washington DC.  The security;      programmers saw a need to disseminate large amounts ofl>      information and provide for communication between program@      participants in different locations.  Because the Board was@      established for internal purposes, the phone number was notB      published.  However, the number was provided to others in theB      computer security community who could provide information andD      make suggestions to help improve the bureau's security program.=      Gradually, others became aware of the Board's existence.a  E      Q: What kinds of files and/or programs do you have on the Board?p6      Why/how do you choose the files you have on-line?  F      A: There is a wide variety of files posted.  In the beginning, weC      posted policy documents, newsletter articles from our internaleA      security newsletter, bulletins issued by CERT, such as virusn;      warnings, and others for internal use.  I located somemD      "underground" files that described techniques for circumventingE      security on one of the systems we manage.  The information, fromoD      Phrack magazine, was posted for our security managers to use toF      strengthen security.  When we were called by others with the same:      systems, we would direct them to those files as well.F      Unexpectedly, the "hacker" that had written the file contacted meD      through our BBS.  In his article he mentioned several automated?      tools that had helped him take advantage of the system.  I F      requested that he pass on copies of the programs for our use.  HeD      agreed.  This is how our "hacker file areas" came to be.  OtherE      hackers have done the same, and have we also received many filesdB      that may be useful.  It is, indeed, an unusual situation whenD      hackers and security professionals work together to help secureA      systems.  However, this communication has been beneficial inm,      strengthening an already secure system.  .      Q: How did you get the idea to set it up?  C      A: The security branch accesses many BBSs on a daily basis forlE      research purposes, information retrieval and to communicate withaB      others.  Since our security program is decentralized, the BBS@      seemed to be an effective way of communicating with program'      participants in diverse locations.   *                             <end excerpts>  E Perhaps the anonymous accusers are correct: Some types of informationiC may pose a risk if abused. But, in an open democracy, the potentialaE for abuse has been neither a necessary nor a sufficient justificationBF to silence those with whom we disagree.  If potential for abuse were aE primary criterion for suppressing the flow of information and freedom F of expression, we would live in a rather silent world, and there would? likely be no RISKS digest (which arguably subverts the nationaltD interest by undermining faith in computers and in government, all of+ which is largely done with public funding)..  C Hiding behind anonymity to reduce the risks of accounting for theirBC accusations, the anonymous posters call not only for silencing, but ! for sanctions against the sysops.l This suggests several risks:  ? 1) Posters who are unwilling to accept responsibility for theirs8 claims are more able to distort information in ways that> leave the target vulnerable and unable to face their accusers.  @ 2) Anonymous posters who call for silencing and sanctions on the= basis of unexamined and questionable claims create a chilling   effect on freedom of expression.  @ 3) Anonymous posters with an apparent axe to grind contribute toD poisoning the well of free information and reduce the opportunity to! openly discuss and debate issues.d  F Our society can far more readily tolerate the existence of informationC that some may find inappropriate than we can risk the censorship ofdA information because it offends a few zealots engaged in a form ofp2 cyber-guerilla warfare by making anonymous claims.  1 Jim Thomas, Cu-Digest, Sociology/Criminal Justice . Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115  I                   [OTHER MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT WERE LARGELY REDUNDANT CH                   TO THE PRECEDING CONTRIBUTIONS, AND ARE OMITTED.  PGN]   ------------------------------   End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.68  ************************