[ From:	CRDGW2::CRDGW2::MRGATE::"SMTP::CRVAX.SRI.COM::RELAY-INFO-VAX" 16-OCT-1990 19:34:35.64  To:	MRGATE::"ARISIA::EVERHART" CC:	, Subj:	Re: request for crypt software for vms  * Received:  by crdgw1.ge.com (5.57/GE 1.75)) 	 id AA06132; Tue, 16 Oct 90 19:17:45 EDT S Received: From CRDGW1.GE.COM by CRVAX.SRI.COM with TCP; Tue, 16 OCT 90 06:05:46 PDT * Received:  by crdgw1.ge.com (5.57/GE 1.75)) 	 id AA25029; Tue, 16 Oct 90 09:01:01 EDT / Message-Id:  <9010161301.AA25029@crdgw1.ge.com>  Date: 16 Oct 90 08:54 EST # From: EVERHART%ARISIA.DECNET@crdgw1 / Subject: Re: request for crypt software for vms  To: info-vax@sri.com  9 Re the request for info on encryption software for VMS... C   We used the Bear Systems virtual disks for some time, and now use I my drivers. Bear's drivers support driver-based ACLs over and above those E of VMS, and the nifty option to hang a process that violates security H access so that you can examine at your leisure what was being attempted,D as well as logging all failed access attempts. My drivers don't haveC that, but FDDRV has several cryptodisk "host processes", which do a C fairly decent job of garbling text into rubbish and restoring it to G sense. It can be found on VAX SIG tapes and a few FTP sites; I recently G sent my latest & greatest to Ehud Gavron's site (sunquest.com) where it  is available for FTP. E    I tend to favor cryptodisks rather than encryption programs, which I abound in the public domain, because my experience is that the data which @ needs to be secured is often administered by people not computerI literate enough to reliably use crypt/decrypt commands every time, and by H software to which hooks cannot readily be added to handle encrypted dataI correctly. A driver that encrypts its contents automatically encrypts all C data stored there and allows a system manager to provide reasonable E security without a lot of hassles. A simple command file to mount the G cryptodisk unit and get the crypto key lets the data owner do the mount D himself (If something sensitive enough to need a cryptodisk is on my@ machine, *I* don't want to be on the access list for it and thusA chargeable with responsibility for leaks) and by having the drive C controlled by a subprocess, logout automatically gets the system to A forget the key. Neat stuff, and software needs NO hooks to handle F encrypted data. My driver's algorithm is fast and imposes no excessiveA burden. (An earlier driver I did for IAS back around 1978 used an E algorithm similar to DES which DID eat a marvelous amount of CPU time H while running. That's why I tend to believe software DES is likely to beH a bad idea for cryptodisks. Of course, the sources of my driver are suchA that adding DES encryption would be fairly easy, instead of or in ? addition to the existing algorithm; being public domain has its B advantages. Incidentally, the Bear drivers do not use DES either.)  D    If you want to encrypt data and don't happen to have a crypt toolE around, a compression tool that's one-pass will do nicely. The key is F that the compress tool must be one-pass, so the output depends only onI what went into it before the point of output, not on a global file. Thus, A Huffman compressors will not work this way; LZW compressors (like  compresss) will.H    Also, you should see that the compressor does not reset itself duringD the compress if possible; such a reset may allow decipherment of the data. G    The method is simple: Take a file you and your recipient have. Let's F say it's 5 blocks long and compresses to a file 3 blocks long. (EnsureI you're working with stream files or fixed files here; VMS variable record $ streams can introduce complexities.)G    Now take the file you want to encipher. Tack the keyfile in front of $ it so you have now a file like this:*   <---keyfile><---file to send crypted--->  4    Now compress this file. This gives something like   <-ckey-><-ccryptfile->H   where ckey is compressed key, and ccryptfile is compressed file you'reI sending. The ccryptfile consists of strings of tokens of variable numbers A of bits which correspond to text strings largely depending on the  contents of keyfile.H    Now chop off most of ckey. In the example mentioned, you know ckey is@ 3 blocks long, so chop off the first 2.2 blocks, let's say. YourH recipient needs to know how many bytes you chopped off as well as havingF the keyfile, unless he wants to do some heavy pattern matching to findI the point himself. If you succeed in chopping off all of ckey, of course,  this is not essential.@    You now send the truncated compressed file to your recipient:   -><-ccryptfile->=   where "->" is meant to mean that part of ckey may be there.   E    The recipient now compresses keyfile and where you chopped off and D threw out n bytes, HE saves exactly n bytes of his ckey, prepends itG to the file you sent him, decompresses, and throws out the uncompressed I keyfile. Voila! Now he has the file in the clear, and someone lacking the I keyfile will have a hard time duplicating the decode. Much of this can be H wrapped in command procedures. I consider this an interesting proof thatH encryption can be a side effect of many types of operations as well as a possibly useful technique.  E    It would be interesting to hear from folks using the algorithms of H LHARC to see whether this technique would work with them also. ObviouslyG by compressing, this technique reduces the amount of material that must D be sent as well as hiding its contents, and may have advantages overH cryptors that don't compress. The cryptographic strength of this sort ofG thing is unclear, though by reducing the redundancy in the information, 3 compression has got to make decrypting data harder.   D    The foregoing techniques are of course public domain also. Enjoy. Glenn Everhart Everhart@Arisia.dnet.ge.com   