] From:	HENRY::IN%"leichter-jerry%YALE.ARPA%SRI-KL.ARPA%relay.cs.net@rca.com" 19-NOV-1986 10:20 B To:	decwrl!oracle.dec.com!waters@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Greg Waters, Subj:	Re: DECnet security   K [It appears that my wording in a recent info-vax message was open to misin- K terpretation; I doubt Greg was the only one to read it this way.  I hope he J doesn't object to my making this reply, and excerpts from this note to me, public.]  I     Your recent reply on info-vax implies that DECnet access controls are L     useless unless all machines on the network are secured such that hostileI     users don't have privileges.  Is that true?  Does a SYSPRV user on an M     unknown machine really have the ability to NCP TELL a restricted machine, L     or a machine with knowledge of the passwords of restricted machines, and(     list the access control information?J No.  When I talked about a user with SYSPRV being allowed in "despite suchN access restrictions", the antecedent of "such" was intended to be a particularM kind of access restriction mentioned in the previous sentence:  That control- M led by the NCP SET EXEC/NODE nnn ACCESS command.  These commands allow you to L make an entire node accessible or not, incoming or outgoing.  This is a veryH non-specific form of access control, and as far as I know is not in veryL wide-spread use.  It, and no other form of access control that I know of, isN over-ridden by privileges on the remote machine.  (Well, that's not quite trueN - I think a privileged remote user can start a link to a machine whose EXEC isK set to state SHUT, which normally prevents any new links from being formed. ( But I'm not absolutely certain of this.)  & 					  I thought that any machine thatI     wanted to use access controls in an open network should also apply an M     access control to NML, thereby making it impossible for Joe Random SYSPRV =     to list the privileged information from a remote machine. N NML is (a) the Network Management Listener protocol; (b) a network object thatN speaks this protocol; (c) a program that implements this object.  I'm not sureI which of these you mean, or what kind of access controls you would apply.   K Normally, the remote NML runs non-privileged in the default DECnet account. N It can read most information in the database - passwords definitely excepted -H and it can't change anything.  (Changing stuff in the permanent databaseK requires the ability to write to the files that store it - normally, SYSPRV H will do.  Reading the passwords requires BYPASS.  Changing the temporaryN database requires something like SYSPRV, I'm not sure exactly what.)  The onlyL way NML would be able to do this sort of stuff for you remotely is if it ranM in an appropriately privileged account, either via a proxy - not a good idea! J - or by the remote user providing explicit access control information - byL using a node specification of the form NODE"privileged-username password"::.  N     I haven't tried this myself, but if I'm right, you may want to update yourE     comments about the ability to violate security with remote SYSPRV G     accounts.  To reiterate, what I'm suggesting is this (and I haven't M     checked to be sure):  If you want to secure a machine, give it a password       for non-privileged connects.I Now you are talking about something else again:  Password protection that L controls which machines can talk to each other over a given line.  This is aK low-level control mechanism, and has no effect on messages routed through a  host once it is connected.  . 				  Distribute that password to all machinesL     that need to access the restricted machine.  Then, for all machines thatE     have the password, including the restricted machine, secure their K     privileged network control functions by putting a password on their NML M     object (since that object could be used to read or set the non-privileged E     password of the restricted machines).  With this scheme, you need L     cooperation from the system managers only of the machines that will have%     access to the restricted machine. C I'm really unclear about what problem you claim to be solving here.   @     Now, what to do about node name aliases in the network??  GWI Yet another issue, almost in a class with protection against wiretappers.   H Access control on DECnet is a complex subject.  There's a lot of historyG there, and all the old mechanisms co-exist with newer, generally better H mechanisms.  The "Guide to Networking on VMS" contains about 12 pages ofK general discussion of this issue, outlining the several layers and types of K such controls - plus, of course, detailed documentation of the NCP commands J that implement all these controls.  There is additional information in theH "Guide to VAX/VMS System Security", including but not limited to a wholeF chapter of some 27 pages on "Security for a DECnet Node".  The generalN security philosophy is that nodes are isolated security domains, and privilegeJ on one node does NOT, but default, imply any special privileges on another3 (except in a couple of very limited special cases).   L Given all the readily-available information, I strongly advise anyone reallyL concerned about this issue to do a little reading first.  You are not likely8 to get more than an overview from anything on this list.   							-- Jerry  ------- 