Y From:	HENRY::IN%"JSPEAR%AI.AI.MIT.EDU%SRI-KL.ARPA%relay.cs.net@rca.com" 16-NOV-1986 10:54  To:	MHJohnson@HI-MULTICS.ARPA * Subj:	RE: DECNET Security Questions (LONG)   >Date:  Sun, 9 Nov 86 11:57 CST 0 >From:  Mark Johnson <MHJohnson@HI-MULTICS.ARPA>$ >Subject:  DECNET Security Questions >To:  info-vax@SRI-KL.ARPA3 >Message-ID:  <861109175720.777844@HI-MULTICS.ARPA>  > B >...  We are concerned that proprietary information might be moved) >from system to system w/o being detected   N I run a VAX on a DECnet network (nowhere near MIT) and we are concerned about M similar problems. Computer and network security is a complex issue that most  L organizations have yet to come to grips with. Here are a few things to look J at and think about. I'd be interested in hearing what you come up with on 0 your own and/or suggestions you get from others.  J Before addressing your specific questions, let me climb on my soapbox and K spout some applehood and mother pie on information security that you might   not have heard before.  I -- Decide what you are protecting and why. You must assess the value and  K quantity of information, software, and hardware you are trying to protect.  N What is the impact if this falls into the hands (electronically or otherwise) H of an  unauthorized person? What if it is altered or corrupted? What if $ legitimate users are denied access?   M -- Know your vulnerabilities, your weaknesses that could be exploited. These  G probably include potential attacks against physical security, computer  H hardware and software, personnel, administrative procedures, accidents, N compromising emanations, and natural (?) disasters to name a few. What is the $ value lost if each of these happens?  M -- Look at your environment and determine how likely each type of attack is.  0 Could it ever happen? How often could it happen?  G -- Now that you have assessed your current level of risk, decide on an  J acceptable level you are willing to live with. Realize that you can never I elimanate all risks, but you can reduce most risks if you are willing to  G expend the resources. The level of resources committed to countering a  J specific vulnerability should be commensurate with its likelihood and its M cost should it happen. Remember that security is only as good as your weakest M link. If you have done everything you can think of but someone can walk away  L with your backup tapes or tap your ethernet, you still have a major problem.  J -- Plan and implement countermeasures. Test them initially to verify they J work, and periodically retest to make sure they still work. Make sure you 5 understand the residual level of risk you still take.   H -- Any time there is any change to anything that might affect security, L review everything again from step one above. Since you carefully documented B all of the above, it won't be as much work the second time around.  F Starting to step down from the soapbox, the point of all this is that L security is a broad area that encompasses many disciplines. If you are only J looking at network security or physical security, you're probably leaving L yourself wide open somewhere else. Depending on what you're protecting from ; who, it may be very foolish to connect to a network at all.   M There, my feet are back on the ground. I'll now assume you have already gone  N though some analysis like I discussed above and your only problem is that you L are now considering a DECnet connection to a customer's computer. Of course J you have already eliminated or secured all dialup lines since they pose a D risk that is in some ways larger than the contemplated network link.  I >  (1) Should I disable the default DECNET account completely or is there H >a way to properly restrict access to files and other resources instead?  E Carefully read the Networking Manual and the Guide to VAX/VMS System  	 Security!   K Briefly, the default DECNET account is used only when the remote node does  A not supply login information (either from its NCP data base or a  G user-supplied access control string), no proxy account matches, and no  H account has been specified in the executor NCP database for the network  object being requested.   L I have (only) MAIL, PHONE, and NML tied to a default account, so anyone can J use them remotely. Our biggest worry was remote users using FAL, the File N Access Listener, to poke around on our system and copy files they might find, N so I have put several (redundant) restrictions on FAL. (FAL restrictions also L prevent use of SUBMIT/REMOTE and things like the TELL command files sent to L the net a few months ago.) The system-wide login command file checks to see J if this is a default account, and if it is, sets FAL$COMMAND :== $LOGOUT. I SYS$SYSTEM:FAL.COM and FAL.EXE have an ACL denying access to the default  H accounts. (Each precaution is equal in power, but they make it a little L harder for them to be accidentally disabled.) To use FAL now, a remote user M must use an access control string (NODE"Username password"::), but even then  K some files are protected with an ACL denying NETWORK access. Similarly, if  H the user SETs HOST, some files are protected with an ACL denying REMOTE  access.   K Remember that with access control strings the Username and Password show up L on the screen, in the recall buffer, may show up in command files, and will G get transmitted over the net. Proxy accounts are intended to fix these  L problems, but proxies require you to trust all other system managers on the  net.  M Of course you should take the usual precautions with the default account(s):  N Put them in a group by themselves, captive, LGICMD pointing to a command file H not in the default directly that has W:E protection and is owned by the K system UIC, lockpwd, only network access, on a device with quota's enabled   and a moderate quota set.   G >  (2) Can I reject SET HOST commands from some nodes?  I would like to ; >implicitly reject all nodes & then allow access from some.   G There is currently no way within NCP to allow a node to access certain  L objects while restricting access to others. Within NCP, the closest you can M come is to allow only incoming or only outgoing access for a particular node.   K One way to restrict SET HOST is to put some checks in my system-wide login  K command file to check the job logical names SYS$REM_NODE and/or SYS$REM_ID  K (new for VMS 4.4), and take appropriate action. I have also added a system  N logical name that controls whether a remote login is allowed at all, and have M a recurring batch job to reset this logical every evening. The main weakness  N here is that these checks can't be made until after the user has successfully J logged in with a valid username and password. To address that problem, we I also enable security alarms for remote logins and breakin detection with  L evasive action, so we know who is diddling with the system, successfully or H otherwise. Finally, I don't allow any privileged or otherwise sensitive ? accounts to have REMOTE (or NETWORK) access enabled in the UAF.   H Be aware that it is fairly easy for a system to masquerade with another A node's name and for any account name to be created on that node.    K One additional precaution I have contemplated is to require an algorithmic  J password to be entered for all remote logins (e.g. the current day of the : week spelled backwards) at what looks like a DCL $ prompt.  I >  (3) Should I add a proxy entry of *::* -> XXX, where XXX is a username G >that is disabled from network operations?  Does this gain me anything?   L No. This is nearly equivalent to having no default DECnet account(s) and no J proxies, and would still allow incoming access via SET HOST. It would, of L course, prevent incoming MAIL, PHONE or NML requests/messages which you may L want to allow. It would affect users on both trusted and untrusted machines.  L One reasonable measure along these lines might be to disable communications J to the untrusted node (physically disconnect or at least $MC NCP SET CIRC N (and line) xxxx STATE OFF) during times when legitimate network access is not  needed.   E >  (4) Should I dedicate a MicroVAX for this link & control access at + >that point or does it make any difference?   M If all nodes are in the same DECnet area, simply adding another routing node  L in the middle won't make any difference other than slowing down the traffic L and loading the MicroVAX with transit packets. If, however, the MicroVAX is N an area router, it makes it more difficult for a casual user in the untrusted F area to find out the names and addresses of nodes in the trusted area.  H >  (5) Must all systems on the network be protected or can a `fire wall'7 >be set up (like on the system described in 4) instead?   L I don't know of any easy way to do this. I am sure that if you were willing I to muck around with the internals of DECnet routing mechanisms, or would  N allow only task-task communications using protocols of your own creation, you K could get almost any software strength of "firewall" you might want. There  M are some sticky problems in deciding what modes of access to allow, and what  K sort of authentication to require of users. It is also hard to verify that  M these measures are adequate, correctly implemented, and can't be bypassed. A  M restricted access router or gateway like this seems like something that might J have wide applicability, so there might be commercial products addressing 
 this need.  K One simple scheme that is relatively easy to implement but hard to use and  K manage is to use the MicroVAX as a buffer machine that may be connected to  N only one side of the network at a time and checking information that has been H added before allowing it to change sides. Of course this will slow down 5 traffic and won't allow PHONE or SET HOST through it.    > ... ' >  --Mark <MHJohnson @ HI-MULTICS.ARPA>   K One final note. If, as you stated initally, your only concern is detecting  K access to proprietary information, maybe all you need are ACLs on all such  5 files that cause an ALARM any time they are accessed.    Hope this helps,, 	- Jon Spear <JSpear @ MIT-AI> (505)844-0107  