Hi,

You write:

>I haven't read the Scientific American article but I have followed the
>EFF material carefully which exposes flagrant violations of the law,
>and attempts to introduce draconian laws, in relation to cyberspace
>(and adds to my confidence that such attempts are futile and cyberspace
>will win :-)

Perhaps in the long run.  In the short run...  ask Steve Jackson.  The article
I cited describes how the Secret Service showed up and deprived him of his
means of making a living (computers, all backup tapes, and all hardcopies of
the drafts for the book for a game his company was developing) for something
like SIX MONTHS.  All because one of his employees -- "on his own time and on a
BBS he ran from his house -- made an innocuous comment about [...] Kermit". ie
Steve Jackson Games had done absolutely nothing wrong, yet the property was
siezed and First and Fourth amendment rights were blatantly disregarded. 

I agree with you that ITAR can be (and should be) interpreted to mean that
information that is freely distributed within the U.S. should not have export
restrictions placed on it.  The reality is that the other side holds all the
cards, has an infinitely long memory, and *cannot even be counted upon to obey
its own rules*. 

>There are NO interests in the U.S. that have a stake in preventing
>the export of information that is freely available from public
>libraries and bookshops. 

Two responses to this.  

1: You may be right, but I would not presume to guess what interests may exist
in the U.S. (it's a big place, you know) and so I would not advise anyone to
bet their business (or, if a university, grant monies and so on) on this
proposition until it's been proven. 

2: You may be right.  However, it may not matter.  An action such as that taken
against Steve Jackson Games might be taken against, for example, an FTP site
simply because of *perceived* violations.  Given the fact that selective
reading of ITAR can lead to the conclusion that export of *any* cryptographic
software (regardless of p-d status) requires a license, a warrant might be 
issued and executed on the basis of a selective reading.


	--- Jamie Hanrahan, Kernel Mode Consulting, San Diego CA
Chair, VMS Internals Working Group, U.S. DECUS VAX Systems SIG 
Internet:  jeh@cmkrnl.com, hanrahan@eisner.decus.org, or jeh@crash.cts.com
Uucp:  ...{crash,eisner,uunet}!cmkrnl!jeh