13 May 1999. Birdie says that it is another, yet unidentified, US Web site
which published 100+ names of MI6 officers. The site is said to be now
inactive. A press report on it should be appearing in Europe later today.
That's all we know until birdie dumps more.
12 May 1999
Source: http://www.geocities.com/Paris/Jardin/8767/MI6dir.htm
The source URL disappeared on May 12, 1999, at about 5:00 PM US-CST. A. has
provided a TAR.Z compressed file of the complete site:
http://jya.com/mi6-rt.gz (79K).
Richard Tomlinson has written us today that there was never any names or
information on his site that was not public information, and that HMG is
overreacting for public effect to stigmatize his efforts. The names of MI6
officers cited in his affidavit on MI6 and Princess Diana below:
Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN
Richard David SPEARMAN
Chief of MI6 David SPEDDING
Nicholas Bernard Frank FISHWICK
Maurice KENDWRICK-PIERCEY
John RIDDE
Richard FLETCHER
Alan PETTY
Chief of MI6 Colin McCOLL
These names, and another, Andrew Fulton, were previously publicized:
http://www.inside-news.ch/Shayler/!milosev.htm (mirrored here)
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Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v
Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v
Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v
Tomlinson
Directory of MI6 Officers
The first step to bringing accountability to MI6 is to publish the
names of their officers. Every other branch of British public service
publishes an annual directory of their officers. The Army has the Army
list, the Police the Constabulary list etc. But MI6 publishes no such
list. Why? Because they do not want their officers to be held
accountable for their actions.
MI6 whine that the publication of such a list would "endanger the lives
of agents". This is a smokescreen. Any member of the UK armed forces or
the police faces far greater physical danger in the course of his
normal duty than an MI6 officer, yet their names are published because
they are legally accountable. So why not MI6 too?
Below is a partial list. It is not yet complete, but further names will
be added as they are researched.
INJUNCTED!! - MI6 obtain another injunction - read below!
[Two images of injunction were not accessible]
[No names provided]
For More Information Contact:
Richard Tomlinson
Email: spectre@worldcom.ch
Last modified: May 11, 1999
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MI6 and the Princess of Wales
Attached below is a sworn and testified statement that I have made on 12th
May 1999 to the enquiry into the deaths of the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al
Fayed, and Henri Paul. I firmly believe that MI6 have information in their
files that would assist Judge Stephan's enquiry. Why don't they yield up
this information? They should not be entitled to use the Official Secrets
Act to protect themselves from investigation into the deaths of three
people, particularly in the case of an incident of this magnitude and
historical importance.
I, Richard John Charles Tomlinson, former MI6 officer, of Geneva,
Switzerland hereby declare:
1. I firmly believe that there exist documents held by the British Secret
Intelligence Service (MI6) that would yield important new evidence
into the cause and circumstances leading to the deaths of the Princess
of Wales, Mr Dodi Al Fayed, and M. Henri Paul in Paris in August 1997.
2. I was employed by MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995. During
that time, I saw various documents that I believe would provide new
evidence and new leads into the investigation into these deaths. I
also heard various rumours – which though I was not able to see
supporting documents – I am confident were based on solid fact.
3. In 1992, I was working in the Eastern European Controllerate of MI6
and I was peripherally involved in a large and complicated operation
to smuggle advanced Soviet weaponry out of the then disintegrating and
disorganised remnants of the Soviet Union. During 1992, I spent
several days reading the substantial files on this operation. These
files contain a wide miscellany of contact notes, telegrams,
intelligence reports, photographs etc, from which it was possible to
build up a detailed understanding of the operation. The operation
involved a large cast of officers and agents of MI6. One more than one
occasion, meetings between various figures in the operation took place
at the Ritz Hotel, Place de Vendome, Paris. There were in the file
several intelligence reports on these meetings, which had been written
by one of the MI6 officers based in Paris at the time (identified in
the file only by a coded designation). The source of the information
was an informant in the Ritz Hotel, who again was identified in the
files only by a code number. The MI6 officer paid the informant in
cash for his information. I became curious to learn more about the
identity of this particular informant, because his number cropped up
several times and he seemed to have extremely good access to the
goings on in the Ritz Hotel. I therefore ordered this informant’s
personal file from MI6’s central file registry. When I read this new
file, I was not at all surprised to learn that the informant was a
security officer of the Ritz Hotel. Intelligence services always
target the security officer’s of important hotels because they have
such good access to intelligence. I remember, however, being mildly
surprised that the nationality of this informant was French, and this
stuck in my memory, because it is rare that MI6 succeeds in recruiting
a French informer. I cannot claim that I remember from this reading of
the file that the name of this person was Henri Paul, but I have no
doubt with the benefit of hindsight that this was he. Although I did
not subsequently come across Henri Paul again during my time in MI6, I
am confident that the relationship between he and MI6 would have
continued until his death, because MI6 would never willingly
relinquish control over such a well placed informant. I am sure that
the personal file of Henri Paul will therefore contain notes of
meetings between him and his MI6 controlling officer right up until
the point of his death. I firmly believe that these files will contain
evidence of crucial importance to the circumstances and causes of the
incident that killed M. Paul, together with the Princess of Wales and
Dodi Al Fayed.
4. The most senior undeclared officer in the local MI6 station would
normally control an informant of M.Paul’s usefulness and seniority.
Officers declared to the local counter-intelligence service (in this
case the Directorate de Surveillance Territoire, or DST) would not be
used to control such an informant, because it might lead to the
identity of the informant becoming known to the local intelligence
services. In Paris at the time of M. Paul’s death, there were two
relatively experienced but undeclared MI6 officers. The first was Mr
Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN, born 1960. The second was Mr Richard
David SPEARMAN, again born in 1960. I firmly believe that either one
or both of these officers will be well acquainted with M Paul, and
most probably also met M. Paul shortly before his death. I believe
that either or both of these officers will have knowledge that will be
of crucial importance in establishing the sequence of events leading
up to the deaths of M.Paul, Dodi Al Fayed and the Princess of Wales.
Mr Spearman in particular was an extremely well connected and
influential officer, because he had been, prior to his appointment in
Paris, the personal secretary to the Chief of MI6 Mr David SPEDDING.
As such, he would have been privy to even the most confidential of MI6
operations. I believe that there may well be significance in the fact
that Mr Spearman was posted to Paris in the month immediately before
the deaths.
5. Later in 1992, as the civil war in the former Yugoslavia became
increasingly topical, I started to work primarily on operations in
Serbia. During this time, I became acquainted with Dr Nicholas Bernard
Frank FISHWICK, born 1958, the MI6 officer who at the time was in
charge of planning Balkan operations. During one meeting with Dr
Fishwick, he casually showed to me a three-page document that on
closer inspection turned out to be an outline plan to assassinate the
Serbian leader President Slobodan Milosevic. The plan was fully typed,
and attached to a yellow "minute board", signifying that this was a
formal and accountable document. It will therefore still be in
existence. Fishwick had annotated that the document be circulated to
the following senior MI6 officers: Maurice KENDWRICK-PIERCEY, then
head of Balkan operations, John RIDDE, then the security officer for
Balkan operations, the SAS liaison officer to MI6 (designation
MODA/SO, but I have forgotten his name), the head of the Eastern
European Controllerate (then Richard FLETCHER) and finally Alan PETTY,
the personal secretary to the then Chief of MI6, Colin McCOLL. This
plan contained a political justification for the assassination of
Milosevic, followed by three outline proposals on how to achieve this
objective. I firmly believe that the third of these scenarios
contained information that could be useful in establishing the causes
of death of Henri Paul, the Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed. This
third scenario suggested that Milosevic could be assassinated by
causing his personal limousine to crash. Dr Fishwick proposed to
arrange the crash in a tunnel, because the proximity of concrete close
to the road would ensure that the crash would be sufficiently violent
to cause death or serious injury, and would also reduce the
possibility that there might be independent, casual witnesses. Dr
Fishwick suggested that one way to cause the crash might be to
disorientate the chauffeur using a strobe flash gun, a device which is
occasionally deployed by special forces to, for example, disorientate
helicopter pilots or terrorists, and about which MI6 officers are
briefed about during their training. In short, this scenario bore
remarkable similarities to the circumstances and witness accounts of
the crash that killed the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed, and Henri
Paul. I firmly believe that this document should be yielded by MI6 to
the Judge investigating these deaths, and would provide further leads
that he could follow.
6. During my service in MI6, I also learnt unofficially and second-hand
something of the links between MI6 and the Royal Household. MI6 are
frequently and routinely asked by the Royal Household (usually via the
Foreign Office) to provide intelligence on potential threats to
members of the Royal Family whilst on overseas trips. This service
would frequently extend to asking friendly intelligence services (such
as the CIA) to place members of the Royal Family under discrete
surveillance, ostensibly for their own protection. This was
particularly the case for the Princess of Wales, who often insisted on
doing without overt personal protection, even on overseas trips.
Although contact between MI6 and the Royal Household was officially
only via the Foreign Office, I learnt while in MI6 that there was
unofficial direct contact between certain senior and influential MI6
officers and senior members of the Royal Household. I did not see any
official papers on this subject, but I am confident that the
information is correct. I firmly believe that MI6 documents would
yield substantial leads on the nature of their links with the Royal
Household, and would yield vital information about MI6 surveillance on
the Princess of Wales in the days leading to her death.
7. I also learnt while in MI6 that one of the "paparazzi" photographers
who routinely followed the Princess of Wales was a member of "UKN", a
small corps of part-time MI6 agents who provide miscellaneous services
to MI6 such as surveillance and photography expertise. I do not know
the identity of this photographer, or whether he was one of the
photographers present at the time of the fatal incident. However, I am
confident that examination of UKN records would yield the identity of
this photographer, and would enable the inquest to eliminate or
further investigate that potential line of enquiry.
8. On Friday August 28 1998, I gave much of this information to Judge
Hervé Stephan, the French investigative Judge in charge of the inquest
into the accident. The lengths which MI6, the CIA and the DST have
taken to deter me giving this evidence and subsequently to stop me
talking about it, suggests that they have something to hide.
9. On Friday 31 July 1998, shortly before my appointment with Judge Hervé
Stephan, the DST arrested me in my Paris hotel room. Although I have
no record of violent conduct I was arrested with such ferocity and at
gunpoint that I received a broken rib. I was taken to the headquarters
of the DST, and interrogated for 38 hours. Despite my repeated
requests, I was never given any justification for the arrest and was
not shown the arrest warrant. Even though I was released without
charge, the DST confiscated from me my laptop computer and Psion
organiser. They illegally gave these to MI6 who took them back to the
UK. They were not returned for six months, which is illegal and caused
me great inconvenience and financial cost.
10. On Friday 7th August 1998 I boarded a Qantas flight at Auckland
International airport, New Zealand, for a flight to Sydney, Australia
where I was due to give a television interview to the Australian
Channel Nine television company. I was in my seat, awaiting take off,
when an official boarded the plane and told me to get off. At the
airbridge, he told me that the airline had received a fax "from
Canberra" saying that there was a problem with my travel papers. I
immediately asked to see the fax, but I was told that "it was not
possible". I believe that this is because it didn't exist. This action
was a ploy to keep me in New Zealand so that the New Zealand police
could take further action against me. I had been back in my Auckland
hotel room for about half an hour when the New Zealand police and
NZSIS, the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service, raided me. After
being detained and searched for about three hours, they eventually
confiscated from me all my remaining computer equipment that the
French DST had not succeeded in taking from me. Again, I didn't get
some of these items back until six months later.
11. Moreover, shortly after I had given this evidence to Judge Stephan, I
was invited to talk about this evidence in a live television interview
on America’s NBC television channel. I flew from Geneva to JFK airport
on Sunday 30 August to give the interview in New York on the following
Monday morning. Shortly after arrival at John F Kennedy airport, the
captain of the Swiss Air flight told all passengers to return to their
seats. Four US Immigration authority officers entered the plane, came
straight to my seat, asked for my passport as identity, and then
frogmarched me off the plane. I was taken to the immigration detention
centre, photographed, fingerprinted, manacled by my ankle to a chair
for seven hours, served with deportation papers (exhibit 1) and then
returned on the next available plane to Geneva. I was not allowed to
make any telephone calls to the representatives of NBC awaiting me in
the airport. The US Immigration Officers - who were all openly
sympathetic to my situation and apologised for treating me so badly -
openly admitted that they were acting under instructions from the CIA.
12. In January of this year, I booked a chalet in the village of Samoens
in the French Alps for a ten day snowboarding holiday with my parents.
I picked up my parents from Geneva airport in a hire car on the
evening of January 8, and set off for the French border. At the French
customs post, our car was stopped and I was detained. Four officers
from the DST held me for four hours. At the end of this interview, I
was served with the deportation papers below (exhibit 2), and ordered
to return to Switzerland. Note that in the papers, my supposed
destination has been changed from "Chamonix" to "Samoens". This is
because when first questioned by a junior DST officer, I told him that
my destination was "Chamonix". When a senior officer arrived an hour
or so later, he crossed out the word and changed it to "Samoens",
without ever even asking or confirming this with me. I believe this is
because MI6 had told them of my true destination, having learnt the
information through surveillance on my parent's telephone in the UK.
My banning from France is entirely illegal under European law. I have
a British passport and am entitled to travel freely within the
European Union. MI6 have "done a deal" with the DST to have me banned,
and have not used any recognised legal mechanism to deny my rights to
freedom of travel. I believe that the DST and MI6 have banned me from
France because they wanted to prevent me from giving further evidence
to Judge Stephan’s inquest, which at the time, I was planning to do.
13. Whatever MI6’s role in the events leading to the death of the Princess
of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul, I am absolutely certain that
there is substantial evidence in their files that would provide
crucial evidence in establishing the exact causes of this tragedy. I
believe that they have gone to considerable lengths to obstruct the
course of justice by interfering with my freedom of speech and travel,
and this in my view confirms my belief that they have something to
hide. I believe that the protection given to MI6 files under the
Official Secrets Act should be set aside in the public interest in
uncovering once and for all the truth behind these dramatic and
historically momentous events.
SWORN at )
this day of )
1998, before me:- )
------------------------------------
A Notary Public
EXHIBIT 1 [none provided with file]
EXHIBIT 2 [none provided with file]
For More Information Contact:
Richard Tomlinson
Email: spectre@worldcom.ch
Last modified: May 12, 1999
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