Here's a copy of some correspondence in relation to my implementation
of a `rubber hose proof' (cryptographically deniable) file system
(actually implimented as a block device on which you can mount any
file system). I'm happy with the cryptographic strength of the system
(but feel free to comment anyway). That said, I'm not convinced that
my avoidance of media (i.e disk surface) analysis attacks (which could
potentially show the pre-sense or otherwise of cryptographic file
systems other than the "duress" ones) is entirely effective. I'd like
some comment from gauss-ridden declassification guru's here :)

[...]

Here's how I'm implementing `aspects' in Rubberhose/marutukku;
`aspect' is the term I'm using to refer to the
cryptographically-deniable (i.e rubber-hose-proofed) "portion", of a
maru extent i.e it's a different _aspect_ (view) of the same
underlying physical block extent.

I decided that random split lengths don't add to the security of the
scheme - only 2x from my calculations - which isn't enough to warrant
the increase in memory use and complexity involved.  The extent is
simply divided up into n splits (say 1024 or one every 256k, whichever
is smaller). Each aspect has an encrypted 32bit block remap list
(which is simply a linear array because of the fixed split size).  A
split avoidance bit-map is created from these per-aspect remap lists
on instantiation of the aspects. An individual aspect looks like so
(when saved):

typedef struct
{
    m_u32 keySum; /* key checksum */
    u_char masterKey[MAX_KEY];
    u_char latticeCipherType, blockCipherType;
    u_char pad[MAX_BLOCK - (4 + MAX_KEY + 1 + 1) % MAX_BLOCK]; /* block align */
} maruCycle;

typedef struct
{
    maruCycle cycle;
    u_char keySalt[MAX_PASSPHRASE];
    maruLatticeKey latticeKeySalt[2];
    u_char blockIV[MAX_FS_BLOCK_SIZE];
    u_char latticeSalt[2*MAX_LATTICE_DEPTH*MAX_BLOCK_KEY]; /* must be 64 aligned */
    m_u32 remap[MAX_SPLITS];
    m_u32 iterations;
    maruCipher keyCipherType;
} maruHeaderAspect;    

There are an array of (8 by default) of these constructs in a maruHeader.

The smap accessor macros are simple:

#define	SMAP_SET(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] |= (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8))))
#define	SMAP_CLR(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] &= ~ (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8))))
#define	SMAP_ISSET(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] & (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8))))

By default, each unused maruHeaderAspect struct contains random noise
(except for keyCipherType, which defaults to being the same for all
aspects) and is of course indistinguishable from a valid maruAspect
without the associated key.

Instantiation example:

Say you have three valid aspects, a1, a2 and a3. Arbitrarily, you have
chosen a1 to be the simple duress aspect (i.e ``you expect us to
believe you have solitary letter of donation to the Polit Bureau Ball
in your entire encrypted file system?! Do you know what this is Nikov?
<opens trench coat>. THIS is the finest cryptanalytic device known to
man. THIS is a RUBBERHOSE! *thwap* *thwunk* *boink*. Now... what's the
*real* key Nikov... or should we call you... Nikolay Bukharin?''), a2 to
be the limited disclosure aspect ("Dear diary. Nikita, Ivan, Boris and
<some more guys I feel like selling down the Lenningrad sewage system>
came over today and smoked a *shit load* of hash. Not wanting to
offend, I had a toke, but like that capitalist dog
^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H illustious leader of the freeworld, was
careful not to inhale.") and a3 has your ice-9 formula nicely tucked
away.

You decide one fine morning that you want to add an ATP pre-cursor as
a catalyst to your ice-9 recipe of destruction (ostensibly, you plan
to generate this stuff from cultures of genetically modified mouse
liver cell mitochondria), and provide the a1, a2 and a3 pass-phrases.

a1, a2 and a3 are decrypted. the aspect remap is parsed and used to
create the physical block "avoidance" map (checking for conflicts
along the way).

Joyous about the frozen seas to come, you copy the ATP pre-cursor
catalyst into a3 and the file system tries to write a new block - e.g
b28 - to a3.  b28 is translated through the a3 remap table to b-1
(unallocated). A random block remap number is generated e.g b595 and
tested against the avoidance smap. If free, it is marked and chosen to
be the new a3 mapping, otherwise the algorithm simply does a circular
hunt for the next free entry in the avoidance smap.

Naturally, reading only requires the key of the aspect you are
interested in (divulging). Writing to one aspect without the keys to
the other aspects will randomly trash them as new splits are assigned.

Timer remaps, reads and re-writes:

This would be the simple end of it, were it not but for magnetic
domain leakage/disk surface wear analysis attacks. Theoretically, this
sort of attack could used to demonstrate access patterns by the drive
head in regions outside those used by the duress aspect blocks. What
we want to do here is to make sure the non-data carrying
magnetic/other properties of the disk substrate are as close to a
Jackson Pollock painting as is possible. Three
methods are used:

	1) every few seconds, we read a random number of blocks within
	   a split in a random location and write it back to that same
	   location with a m-1/m (e.g 9/10) (recursive) chance of an
	   additional write.

	2) every-time there is a conventional write, there is a m-1/m
	   chance of a full remap of the split concerned.

	3) every n seconds a random full split remap.
	   (maybe not needed given the statistical properties of the
	    above - I need to think about this a lot more. its not simple)

All aspects are defined to take up 100% of the marutukku extent from
the file-system perspective - this is essential to our deniability
scheme. This works fine with most file-systems - e.g UFS, because they
only write to a small fraction of their addressable blocks when
formatted - i.a few super-blocks and inode, rather than zeroing every
block, and so split usage for a given aspect reflects population of
the file system that pertains to it.

-- 
Prof. Julian Assange  |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
                      |together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org          |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery